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FORGETTING THE CONSTITUTION 
Robert F Nagel* 
We are in the midst of a period of extraordinary public occupa-
tion with the Constitution. In 1987 the self-satisfied and reverential 
symbolism of many of the bicentennial celebrations was nicely 
counterposed by the brutal politics surrounding the hearings on 
Robert Bark's nomination to the Supreme Court. Both these tradi-
tional uses for constitutionalism now characterize much of the 
political reaction to controversial judicial decisions on topics like 
flag burning and abortion; they are likely to appear again during the 
up-coming observances of the adoption of the Bill of Rights. It is, 
then, an appropriate (if quixotic) time to suggest that we should 
forget the Constitution for a while. Reducing the attention given 
the Constitution would not only provide some relief from the sense 
of surfeit but would also-as I will explain-enable the fundamen-
tal charter to play a more useful role in our politics. 
We use the Constitution both as a symbol of unity and as a 
source of self-righteous partisanship because it tends to be viewed as 
a set of affirmative ideals. At various times and in various degrees, 
these ideals have included prosperity, equality, fairness, unity, prop-
erty, liberty, and privacy. I The ideals have been sufficiently general 
that the document has served a cohesive function; they have been 
sufficiently inspirational that, when political debate is colored by 
constitutional rhetoric, perceived stakes have been magnified. 
During the confirmation hearings, Judge Bork did not appreci-
ate the importance of the Constitution as a set of exhilarating affir-
mations. Throughout the hearings, Senator Biden seemed amazed 
at Bark's stodginess, especially regarding the constitutional right to 
use contraceptives announced in Griswold v. Connecticut. After lis-
tening to Bark's criticisms and doubts about the reasoning in that 
case, Biden would spread his arms and grin broadly in an appar-
ently genuine appeal: Surely Bork must see a general right to pri-
vacy in the Constitution; isn't it self-evident that the majority 
cannot intrude "behind the bedroom door" by telling a couple not 
* Moses Lasky Professor of Law. University of Colorado. 
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to use birth control? The bedroom image was not compelling be-
cause of anything in the Constitution; indeed, Biden rarely, if ever, 
felt it necessary to allude to any specific language in the document. 
It was compelling because of what we want to be in the Constitu-
tion. Biden's questions, that is to say, were powerful because they 
were childish-he (and most of the rest of us) confused an intense 
desire for something with the thing's existence. To these heartfelt 
claims, Bark responded only with legalistic doubts about the exist-
ence of limits to the concept of privacy: Would it protect child 
abuse? Bark was always the somber adult, querulous and unmoved 
in the face of the evident pleasures of constitutional affirmation. 
The notion that constitutional law is essentially about a set of 
ideals (as opposed to their limits) is not limited to politicians on 
boisterous occasions. It is also a prevalent view among legal aca-
demics and educated citizens generally. Writing in The New York 
Review of Books, Professor Ronald Dworkin perfectly captured the 
consensus when he pronounced Bark "a constitutional radical who 
rejects a requirement of the rule of law that all sides ... had previ-
ously accepted. "2 Although Dworkin was less than clear in identi-
fying the precise requirement on which there had been such 
widespread agreement, the bulk of his article criticized Bark's 
methodology for determining the intent of the framers. The basis 
for this criticism turns out to be a version of Biden's assumption 
that the Constitution should be an "ennobling document [that was] 
meant to lift up the country." 
The problem, according to Dworkin, is not that Bark empha-
sizes the framers' intent as a proper guide to interpretation nor that 
his view of their intent is concrete. The problem is that, although 
Bark acknowledges (for example, when approving of Brown v. 
Board of Education) that the framers' intent must be thought of as a 
"general principle," he has no explanation for the level of generality 
at which he chooses to define that principle. For example, Bark 
would construe the equal protection clause to prohibit racial dis-
crimination but does not explain why he would not construe it to 
prohibit all discrimination based on prejudice. The failure to ex-
plain his preference for an intermediate level of generality means, 
according to Dworkin, that Bark's philosophy is "not just impover-
ished and unattractive but not philosophy at all." 
Apparently, the legal requirement that all had agreed upon 
before Bark was that the framers' intent should be set at a high level 
of generality: 
2. Dworkin. The Bark .\'omination, NEW YORK REV .. August 13, 1987. 
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Judges in the mainstream of our constitutional practice are much more respect-
ful of the framers' intentions, understood as a matter of principle, than Bork is. 
They accept the responsibility ... to develop legal principles of moral breadth .... 
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Under Dworkin's version of respect for the framers' intentions, the 
Constitution prohibits not only racial discrimination but also dis-
crimination against homosexuals because of the "principle" against 
prejudice. Although Biden probably would prefer a different illus-
tration, Dworkin's point is the one that the Senator made more 
pithily: Why should privacy (and other constitutional principles) 
not be conceived more generally so as to prohibit a broad range of 
offensive governmental actions? 
Perhaps Judge Bark did not provide a satisfactory answer to 
this question. Yet what is striking about Dworkin's critique (and 
also, but less surprisingly, about Biden's rhetorical questions) is that 
their positions are plainly deficient in the same way that Bark's po-
sition is deficient. Dworkin need not have stopped at elevating the 
level of generality of "equal protection" to a prohibition against dis-
criminating on the basis of prejudice. Prejudice might, for example, 
be thought evil because it is based on hatred (whether factually jus-
tified or not). Thus the principle against prejudice might be restated 
as a principle against hatred. Similarly, Biden's concept of "pri-
vacy" need not stop at the bedroom door. The protection of private 
sexual conduct might be thought valuable because of an asserted 
value in uninhibited physical pleasure. Nothing in Biden's earnest 
appeal or in Dworkin's self-assured critique explains in the slightest 
degree why they prefer the more general but still intermediate level 
of generality. 
Although Dworkin alludes to moral philosophy as the ground 
for favoring relatively general principles, much of his article can be 
read as grounding this preference in a iong-established customary 
expectation. For instance, after pointing to familiar evidence that 
the framers of the fourteenth amendment did not intend to desegre-
gate the public schools, Dworkin argues that if Brown is accepted as 
correct and if constitutional meaning is determined by original in-
tent, "We must understand their intentions as large and abstract 
convictions of principle." That is to say, only a general conceptual-
ization of the framers' intent enables us to overcome or disregard 
their specific intention regarding school desegregation. This argu-
ment makes it possible to understand Dworkin's repeated claim that 
Bark is outside legal "tradition" or the "mainstream." Because we 
do have a consensus on Brown, we must also have a widespread 
expectation that intent will be broadly conceptualized. This, per-
haps, is what Dworkin had in mind when he referred to the "re-
quirement ... that all sides ... had previously accepted." 
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The difficulty is that a general preference for highly abstract 
principles does not necessarily emerge from approval of Brown. 
Bork's narrower definition of the relevant principle (as a bar to ra-
cial discrimination) is sufficient to justify a decision prohibiting ra-
cial segregation. Moreover, if, as Dworkin says, "we must 
understand their intentions as large and abstract convictions," obvi-
ously we must understand the framers' intention to exclude school 
segregation as evidence of some general principle, too-a limiting 
principle, but a principle nevertheless. It is possible to engage in 
unpleasant speculations about the sorts of principles that might 
have animated this exclusion. Many of the framers of the four-
teenth amendment were, as Raoul Berger has shown, Negrophobic 
and anti-abolitionist.J These men may have intended to limit the 
equality principle by a principle that would protect associational 
rights, especially where important socialization functions were in-
volved. And they may have intended a limiting principle that 
would protect state regulatory prerogatives. Such competing prin-
ciples are general and, what is more, they are historically far more 
plausible than Dworkin's claim that all government policies based 
on prejudice were to be outlawed. It is precisely generalizations 
about limiting principles that proponents of Brown have to find a 
way around. Brown can be explained on the basis of selective char-
acterization of intent but not on the basis of abstract 
characterization. 
Bork's equal protection principle is somewhat narrower than 
Dworkin's not so much because Bork is outside a tradition that ap-
proves of generality, but because he gives greater weight than does 
Dworkin to generalized competing principles. It might be accurate, 
then, to say that Bork is outside a tradition that approves of simple 
or unitary moral affirmations. And, given the fact that simplicity is 
naturally attractive for the same reason that complexity is innately 
disturbing, there is every reason to expect that this consensus exists. 
Indeed, it was the existence of a widespread preference for uncom-
plicated principles that made Senator Biden's questions about pri-
vacy so hard for Bork to answer persuasively. 
Everyone enjoys clarity, but thinking of the Constitution as a 
set of simple moral affirmations has certain risks. A minor one is 
that a substantial part of the governed might approve of the rele-
vant moral principle only if qualified (as in, "I approve of prosperity 
but only if the wealth is divided equally"). Even if the principle is 
widely accepted, its purity can degenerate into a vapid emptiness (as 
m, "I approve of privacy in family life"). If both accepted and 
3. R. BERGER, GOVERNMDIT BY )CDICIARY, ch. J3 (1977). 
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forceful, the moral affirmation can polarize debate by converting the 
few dissenters (or quibblers) into extremists or heretics. These risks 
are real, but in the remainder of this essay, I will suggest that the 
Biden/Dworkin view of the Constitution also entails a different and 
more serious risk. The simplicity of the principles, I think, insinu-
ates the possibility or even the necessity of simplistic realization. 
Constant reference to constitutional principles, conceived in this 
way, seriously impoverishes public debate. 
Many people, if not most, think that under our Constitution 
large areas of public affairs should be controlled by a set of uncom-
plicated principles. Today, sexual and familiar privacy, free speech, 
and racial equality are among the most broadly accepted of these 
affirmations, although subgroups make similar claims about private 
property, firearms, and even county governments. No matter what 
the content of the underlying value, there is an inevitable disso-
nance in holding both to simple ideals and to the imperative that 
they be realized in the political arena. I am not referring here to the 
fact that politics requires compromise and imperfection (although 
that certainly is one source of tension). I am referring to the fact 
that politics offers rich and varied opportunities. Part of the pull of 
the ideal is its clarity and unity; the political world, however, offers 
up innumerable possibilities for actualizing the ideal in a variety of 
forums. It is logically possible, of course, to appreciate the moral 
affirmation and also the multifarious versions of its realization. But 
there is at least a psychological tension between affirming an un-
complicated ideal and seeing that ideal implemented in a compli-
cated world. 
Most versions of the right to freedom of speech, for example, 
claim there should be a plentiful and varied supply of information. 
Although there is disagreement about the ultimate values to be 
served by an unrestricted opportunity to send and receive informa-
tion, for many people the claim itself is pleasing partly because it 
seems so clear and uncompromised. There is, however, a discon-
certing range of ways in which the claim might be realized in polit-
ical society. 
At one extreme is the library model. Libraries are, needless to 
say, an enormously useful method for supplying and assimilating 
information. They operate on the principles of restriction, selectiv-
ity, and organization. Noise, as well as a vast array of other incom-
patible uses, are restricted in most libraries (although in some 
children's libraries certain kinds of noisy activities are permitted). 
This permits effective investigation and contemplation. Libraries 
are selective in almost every respect. Some are geared to law only 
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or to physics or to children's books; those that are aimed at general 
interest inevitably attempt to provide only books that are relatively 
desirable by one standard or another. Whatever books are selected, 
their usefulness depends largely on the careful way in which access 
to them is organized. They are catalogued and stored according to 
elaborate and precise rules. Readers can choose the type of infor-
mation to which they want to be exposed; they can process that 
information as carefully as is appropriate to their needs. Libraries, 
in short, are highly controlled places, and that is why they are so 
useful for transmitting ideas and information. 
At the other extreme is the urban bazaar model. This is the 
jostling city street, where insistent believers of all kinds pour out a 
jumble of messages from signs and megaphones and pamphlets. Al-
most no kind of information is excluded, and there is no effort made 
to arrange the available information. The excitement and noise 
make controlled selection or careful processing of information diffi-
cult, but the "bazaar" provides the advantages that flow from expo-
sure to the unexpected, the contrasting, and the disturbing. 
Between the "library" and the "bazaar" is a continuum of 
forms, all of which have special advantages and limitations for the 
purposes of free speech-the classroom, the town meeting, the park, 
the courtroom, and so on. Thus, the ideal of freedom of speech can 
be realized under a wide variety of organizations and rules, in a 
political world of many shapes. Indeed, given the special advan-
tages of each form, free speech is best realized in such a world. The 
preferable system is one where there are quiet places and noisy 
streets, specialized libraries and general libraries, classrooms with 
far-ranging discussions and classrooms where one person lectures, 
participatory town meetings with open agendas and executive ses-
sions addressed to a single topic. In such a system almost any idea 
can be expressed and considered somewhere in some degree. 
This is an obvious conclusion and, happily, it is also a descrip-
tion of our political system. But it is necessary to look no further 
than our constitutional law to see that it is a conclusion in serious 
tension with the lure of simple affirmation. As an illustration, con-
sider this case: A state operates an annual agricultural fair. 
Although the subject of the fair is basically agriculture, there are 
displays about industry, mining, and the arts. The fair has been the 
occasion for the kind of face-to-face religious and political prosely-
tizing that tends to take place where large crowds gather. More-
over, the fair sets aside space for booths where organizations can 
distribute literature and solicit funds. Many groups, including the 
Abortion Rights Council, the American Heart Association, the 
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World Home Bible League, and the United States-China Peoples 
Friendship Association, have rented booths. One organization, the 
International Society for Krishna Consciousness, attempts to dis-
tribute literature and solicit away from the booth area to which the 
fair's rules restrict such activities. The issue is whether this restric-
tion violates the principle of free speech. 
An agricultural fair of this sort is a rich mixture of the library 
and bazaar models. Like many libraries, it attempts some restric-
tion of its subject matter. It organizes certain kinds of information 
by providing a specific area for booths to be used for certain pur-
poses. Like the urban bazaar, however, the fair has masses of peo-
ple and allows much disorganized talking and mixing. It permits its 
space to be used by people with almost any political or social inter-
est. The fair has elements of control and also of anarchy. Surely in 
a country that has room for every kind of fair-from tightly con-
trolled commercial exhibits to wild carnivals-this variation is to be 
celebrated as one more opportunity for the expression and utiliza-
tion of information. Viewed from the perspective of a pluralistic 
social system, the requirement that the Krishnas sell their literature 
from a booth is no more offensive than a requirement that certain 
books be shelved in the science section of a library or that political 
placards be left outside a classroom. Such restrictions are not 
threats to a system of free speech; they are versions of such a 
system. 
The Supreme Court, however, found much to explain and 
nothing to celebrate in the facts I have described.4 The majority 
opinion, while managing not to declare the fair's use of booths un-
constitutional, scrutinized the rules with the kind of suspicion usu-
ally reserved for a seedy-looking man knocking at the back door. 
Before grudgingly approving of the booths, the Court observed, for 
instance, that the rules apply "evenhandedly to all." (As if state 
fairs should not occasionally provide booths restricted to agricul-
tural exhibits or to non-commercial material or whatnot.) The 
Court noted that the rule did not "suffer from the more covert 
forms of discrimination" because space was rented on a first-come, 
first-served basis. (As if the possibility of abuse-say, refusing to 
rent space to Republicans-is so dangerous as to preclude all discre-
tionary judgments about the suitability of the material to be sold.) 
The Court asserted that the rules must be justified by a "significant 
governmental interest," which it found in the need to control the 
4. Heffron v. International Society for Krishna Consciousness. Inc., 452 U.S. 640 
(1981). 
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movement of the crowds. (As if the control and organization of 
information does not serve the interest in free speech itself.) 
The dissenting opinion, written by Justice Brennan, was worse. 
He argued that by 
prohibiting distribution of literature outside the booths, the fair officials sharply 
limit the number of fairgoers to whom the proselytizers ... can communicate their 
messages. Only if a fairgoer affirmatively seeks out such information by approach-
ing a booth does [the rule) fully permit potential communicators to exercise their 
First Amendment rights. 
Only a constricted view of free speech could find it threatening for 
the government to arrange information so that those who want it 
can "affirmatively" seek it out. This is precisely what characterizes 
libraries-are card catalogues dangerous?-and is why they are 
enormously valuable for free speech purposes. 
Although they come to different conclusions, both opinions 
suffer from the same deficiency. Both work from a single image, the 
urban bazaar (or "public forum"), and justify or condemn the state 
agricultural fair according to the extent of its deviation from that 
image. The majority somewhat grudgingly imagines a second possi-
bility ("a limited public forum") but the effect of this designation is 
only to permit certain types of limited deviations from the basic 
image. The Justices display almost no appreciation for the advan-
tages of permitting a wide variety of forums for the realization of 
the principle of free speech. 
The free speech clause is usually read as an uncomplicated af-
firmation that information should be freely available. The powerful 
simplicity of this claim carries with it a deeply flawed implication 
that the political world should be arranged in a uniform way. That 
is why the Court was so unappreciative of the free speech variation 
presented by the state fair described above. What is true of this case 
is true of many free speech cases, and what is true of free speech 
cases is true of many kinds of constitutional cases. Our constitu-
tional law continually confounds singular ideals with a homogenous 
world. 
In a sense, Senator Biden performed a useful service when he 
injected his simple affirmations about privacy into public debate 
about the Constitution. Public decisions certainly should be in-
formed by this sort of moral claim. Still, at some point political 
debate should begin to take account of the rich possibilities inherent 
in simple principles. If "privacy" means the insulation and protec-
tion of intimate family relations, it can take many forms. Privacy 
might require empowering parents to know about and control their 
children's behavior. It might require establishing various qualifica-
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tions for getting married as well as various impediments for dissolv-
ing marriage. It might require imposing special responsibilities on 
married partners as well as granting special prerogatives. At least 
as "privacy" has been traditionally understood and valued in our 
society, collective efforts have been made to realize it in these ways. 
Like a library, traditional marriage is heavy with legal restrictions; 
but just as the rules governing libraries afford opportunities for real-
izing speech values, the legal definition of marriage creates rich op-
portunities for realizing the values of privacy. Moreover, the law's 
restrictions and differentiations create a range of forms for the reali-
zation of privacy much as they do for speech. For instance, respon-
sibilities for custody and support can be modified by antenuptial 
agreements; also available are common law marriages, cohabitation, 
and legal separation. The possible gradations are potentially nu-
merous because our federal system of government permits a variety 
of moral judgments to influence the specific design of each state's 
marriage laws. Within each state and among the states, legal con-
straints create the context, meaning, and opportunity by which the 
values behind privacy can be realized. 
Many of our customary versions of privacy have already been 
struck down or have been put in doubt by the Courts It has, for 
example, restricted the authority of the states to enable parents to 
control their children. In most circumstances, unmarried, minor 
females cannot be required to gain their parents' consent before un-
dergoing abortions; indeed, the Court said these children cannot 
necessarily even be required to notify their parents of the decision. 
Perhaps more importantly, the Court has narrowed the discretion 
of local governments to distinguish marriage from other relation-
ships. A state may not prohibit the distribution of contraceptives to 
unmarried minors. In some circumstances, an unmarried father has 
the same right to the custody of his children as a married father. A 
married father's consent may not be required before his wife under-
goes the abortion of what would have become their child. The 
"right to marry" has been announced, and serious observers wonder 
whether no-fault divorce will soon be constitutionally mandated.6 
Recent cases suggest that in the years ahead the Court may 
reverse direction and assign somewhat greater importance to tradi-
5. Planned Parenthood v. Danforth. 428 U.S. 52 (1976) (spousal and parental con-
sent); Bellotti v. Baird. 443 U.S. 622 (1979) (parental consent and notification); H. L. v. 
Matheson, 450 U.S. 398 (1981) (parental consent and notification); Carey v. Population 
Servs. Int"l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977) (contraceptives); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972) 
(custody); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 ( 1978) (right to marry). 
6. Karst, The Freedom of Intimate Association. 89 YALE LJ. 624, 671 (1980). 
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tionallegal structures. 7 If so, critics can be expected to castigate the 
newer decisions as undermining the values represented by "the right 
to privacy." But the strongest protections for family life will 
emerge when the legal edifice that defines marriage can take many 
forms. An image of privacy exclusively based on the tolerant, edu-
cated, upper-middle class family can no more accommodate the 
range of existing human needs and aspirations than the image of the 
urban bazaar can enhance all the values of free speech. Indeed, no 
simple version of "the right to privacy"-no matter how appeal-
ing--can protect the complex values and activities that are really at 
stake. This requires, not a uniform constitutional standard, but a 
full range of regulations at the state level. It requires recourse, not 
to the vivid language of rights, but to the more shaded vocabulary 
that can accompany positive collective action. 
Constitutionalizing privacy in the way that the Court has done 
(and that Senator Biden invites) will eventually impoverish our ex-
perience, our understanding and our debate, just as the Court's ap-
preciation of free speech has been impoverished. We should talk 
and litigate less about attractively simple principles and get on with 
using self-government to realize them in the myriad concrete con-
texts and forms in which they can appear. It is only when our 
minds are not entranced by simple ideals that we can appreciate the 
variety that can make realization of important values possible. Es-
pecially now, at a time when attention to the fundamental law is so 
general and fervent, it is useful to recognize the paradoxical advan-
tages of sometimes forgetting about the Constitution. 
7. E.g., Michael H. v. Gerald D .. 109 S. Ct. 2333 (1989); Webster v. Reproductive 
Health Services, 109 S. Ct. 3040 (1989). 
